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ii ABSTRACT 
The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative Firms:  Private Values* 
by Jos Jansen 
Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals’ beliefs by disclosing and concealing 
information on their cost of investment. The firms’ disclosure strategies affect their 
incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria under 
voluntary disclosure with those under mandatory disclosure in a model where the firms’ 
cost of investment are identically independently distributed.  Under voluntary disclosure 
firms conceal bad news, and disclose good news only if little knowledge spills over to 
their rival. Under mandatory disclosure firms expect higher profits for given 
information acquisition investments, but they may acquire less information. 
 
Keywords: R&D competition, disclosure regulation, knowledge spillovers 
JEL Classification: D82, D83, L23, O31, O32 
                                                 
*   This paper, and its companion paper entitled “The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative 
Firms: Common Values”, is based on Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis at the CentER for Economic 
Research (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). I would like to thank Patrick Bolton, Eric van 
Damme, Tony Carboni, Marco Haan, Paul Heidhues, Johan Lagerlöf, Fréderic Pivetta, Dolf Talman 
for stimulating discussions and helpful comments. Seminar participants at CentER,WZB and 
CORE, and conference participants at ESEM99, EARIE99, ASSET99 are gratefully acknowledged 
for their comments. I am grateful for the hospitality and support of MPSE (Université de Toulouse 
1, France), and the Department of Economics at Princeton University. All errors are mine. 
iii  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Wirkung von Offenlegungsvorschriften auf innovative Firmen:  Unkorrelierte 
Werte 
Unternehmen, welche an einem F&E -Wettbewerb teilnehmen, managen aktiv die 
Erwartungen ihrer Konkurrenten, in dem sie gezielt entscheiden, ob sie Informationen 
über ihre Investitionskosten veröffentlichen oder geheim halten. Durch ihre 
Offenlegungsstrategien beeinflussen sie sowohl die Anreize Ihrer Konkurrenten 
Informationen zu sammeln, wie auch deren Anreize, F&E zu betreiben. Anhand eines 
Modells, in dem die Investitionskosten der Unternehmen unabhängig verteilt sind, 
vergleicht der Beitrag Gleichgewichte in denen die Unternehmen freiwillig wählen, ob 
sie ihre Informationen offen legen wollen, mit den Gleichgewichten, bei denen 
Unternehmen ihre Information offen legen müssen. Können die Unternehmen 
selbstständig entscheiden, ob sie ihre Informationen offen legen wollen, so führt dies 
dazu, dass sie schlechte Nachrichten verbergen und gute Nachrichten nur dann 
veröffentlichen, wenn wenig ihres Wissens von den Konkurrenten genutzt werden kann. 
Sind die Unternehmen jedoch verpflichtet ihre Informationen offenzulegen, so erwarten 
sie einerseits höhere Profite für gegebene Informationsinvestitionen, aber investieren 





A basic property of research and development (R&D) is that it generates information
for the ﬁrms that invest in it. Usually this information is private to the ﬁrms and is
actively acquired by them. This paper, and companion paper Jansen (2001), discusses
how information about the ﬁrms’ cost of R&D investment aﬀects R&D competition
and how these anticipated eﬀects determine the ﬁrms’ incentives to strategically dis-
close information.
In many innovative industries ﬁrms strategically preannounce their innovations.
For example, in the operating system market it is often claimed that Microsoft (MS)
is using preannouncements of its operating system upgrades to drive competition out
of their market.1 Such a preannouncement strategy is called a “vaporware” strategy.
Disclosing good news about your own capabilities of introducing a new product in the
market, discourages rivals to invest in the development of competing products. Taking
a lead in the race gives the leading ﬁrm a strategic advantage, which discourages its
rival to invest, e.g. see Grossman and Shapiro (1987), and Harris and Vickers (1987).
This is a “strategic eﬀect”.
The strategic eﬀect can be observed in another case. British Biotech (BB) is
a pharmaceutical ﬁrm whose main activity is research on and development of anti-
cancer drugs. In the Spring of 1998 director of clinical research Andrew Millar of BB
was sacked after disclosing bad news about BB’s research and commercial strategy.
As a result of the disclosure BB’s stock market value collapsed, reﬂecting its reduced
opportunities in the race for anti-cancer drugs. By concealing their bad test results,
the ﬁrm tried to keep the market optimistic about its capabilities of introducing
a new drug shortly.2 Both cases suggest the predominance of the strategic eﬀect of
information disclosure. Disclosing good news, and concealing bad news about yourself
makes your rivals believe that you will be a strong competitor in the remainder of the
race.
Although the disclosure strategies are driven by the same strategic eﬀect, regu-
latory responses diﬀered substantially. In the 1994-95 licencing court case against
Microsoft Corp., MS’s vaporware practices where investigated (e.g. see US vs MS
27/01/1995). This did not lead to any restrictive regulation of MS’s announcements.
1See e.g. Lopatka and Page (1995), Prentice (1996), Shapiro (1996), United States v. Microsoft,
Civil Action No. 94-1564, and Shapiro and Varian (1999). An extensive anacdotical report on
Microsoft’s strategies is presented in Wallace and Erickson (1992).
2For coverage on this case, e.g. see Financial Times April 21, 27, and their survey at May 2/3
1998.
1Regulations in the pharmaceutical industry, however, require ﬁr m st od i s c l o s et h e i r
intermediate testing results. The attempted concealment by BB had severe negative
consequences for its chances to get approval from the European Medical Evaluation
Agency (EMEA) to sell developed drugs. In this paper we study the eﬀects of disclo-
sure regulation on ﬁrms’ R&D strategies and proﬁts. In particular, we compare ﬁrms’
investments and proﬁts under a regime of mandatory disclosure with those under
voluntary disclosure.
A ﬁrm’s preannouncement need not only have a strategic eﬀect on the expectations
in the industry, but can also reveal some valuable information about the innovation’s
content to the industry. When knowledge about the contents of the innovation spills
over to rival ﬁrms after a preannouncement, this enables rival ﬁrms to catch up in
the R&D race, which lowers a ﬁrm’s incentive to preannounce its innovation. This
informational catching-up eﬀect is central in most patent design literature (e.g. see
Scotchmer, 1991). Therefore a preannouncing ﬁrm faces the following trade-oﬀ.O n
the one hand the ﬁrm creates a strategic advantage by revealing it is a strong R&D
competitor. On the other hand the disadvantage of a preannouncement is that some
of the contents of the innovation spills over to the industry, which makes rival ﬁrms
catch up in the R&D race. While the strategic eﬀect gives ﬁrms an incentive to
preannounce innovations, the informational catching-up eﬀect encourages concealment
of information. This paper illustrates the eﬀect of this trade-oﬀ on the ﬁrms’ strategic
disclosure decisions, and on their incentives to invest in R&D.
In the companion paper, i.e. Jansen (2001), the strategic eﬀect of information
disclosure is countervailed by a diﬀerent informational eﬀect. The companion paper
studies industries in which one ﬁrm’s intermediate success gives not only an indication
of this ﬁrm’s capabilities of developing the new product, but also of that of its rivals.
That is, ﬁrms’ R&D costs are correlated. After an early intermediate success by
one ﬁrm, rivals become more optimistic about their opportunities, and increase their
investments to obtain the innovation ﬁrst. But when favorable information for one ﬁrm
also encourages rivals, the ﬁrm has an incentive to prevent its rivals from learning this
information. Such an informational eﬀect induces ﬁrms to conceal good news about
their R&D cost, and disclose only bad news. Jansen (2001) studies the consequences of
the trade-oﬀ between this informational eﬀect and the strategic eﬀect for investments
and proﬁts.
Finally we make a ﬁrst step in endogenizing the amount of information that ﬁrms
have by introducing strategic information acquisition investments in the model.
2Related literature: Contests in which ﬁrms learn after investing are studied by
e.g. Hendricks and Kovenock (1989), and Choi (1991). These papers assume that
information ﬂows freely between competing ﬁrms. We show in this paper whether
full information disclosure is compatible with the ﬁrms incentives, and whether it is
desirable for ﬁrms.
Recent papers, such as Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), Gosálbez and Díez (2000),
and Rosenkranz (2001), study information disclosure incentives in research joint ven-
tures. Although these studies provide valuable insights in the incentives for informa-
tion disclosure by innovative ﬁrms, they focus on the eﬀects of cooperation between
ﬁrms. We study the incentives to disclose information in a competitive setting, and
focus on the eﬀects of disclosure regulation.
“Vaporware”, i.e. strategic preannouncement of good news and concealment of
bad news, has been analyzed in some papers. One of the ﬁrst papers to point to the
potential strategic implications of preannouncements is Ordover and Willig (1981). In
a seminal contribution by Farrell and Saloner (1986) the strategic eﬀects of product
preannouncements are mainly driven by consumers’ myopia: consumers only antici-
pate a new product after the preannouncement of it. Both Levy (1997), and Lopatka
and Page (1995) note that in a signalling setting preannouncements only have strate-
gic eﬀects when false announcements aﬀect rival’s or consumers’ beliefs. Haan (2000)
provides a signalling model of vaporware with intelligent consumers. False prean-
nouncements do not aﬀect consumers’ beliefs and no information is revealed in equi-
librium. Our paper assumes partially veriﬁability of information, and therefore does
not obtain cheap talk equilibria. A recent paper by Gerlach (2000) studies the eﬀects
of preannouncements on industry entry, and social welfare. The paper diﬀers in at
least two respects from ours. First it studies an asymmetric competitive setting in
which a potential entrant tries to gain future consumers’ demand by preannouncing
a new product. Our paper studies a setting in which two ﬁrms compete in all stages
of the race. Second, Gerlach’s policy analysis diﬀers from ours, since it compares
mandatory disclosure with full concealment. Although this is an interesting theoret-
ical exercise, in practice preannouncements are hard to forbid, since the information
is most valuable for producers of complementary products (such as hardware and
applications software producers). Our paper compares mandatory and voluntary dis-
closure. Some empirical support for the emergence of vaporware eﬀects in the Digital
Versatile Disc (DVD) player industry is given in Dranove and Gandal (2001). In our
paper we present the ﬁrst model that I know of that results in strategic preannounce-
3ments among competing innovative ﬁrms.
A powerful result in the theory of strategic disclosure of veriﬁable information is the
“unraveling result”. Seminal contributions by Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), Mil-
grom and Roberts (1986), and Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) study this result. When
it is known that the sender of information is informed, and information is costlessly
veriﬁable, he cannot do better than disclose his information, given skeptical equilib-
rium beliefs of the receiver. This result relies on the assumptions that information
is costlessly veriﬁable and that it is known that the sender is informed. Uncertainty
about whether or not the sender is informed and non-veriﬁability of uninformedness
disables the unraveling result in most cases. Austen-Smith (1994) shows that when
the receiver is uncertain about the informedness of the sender, the sender can conceal
some of his information in equilibrium. In equilibrium good news is disclosed while
bad news is concealed from the receiver. This argument is generalized and reﬁned by
Shin (1994). Recently Krishnan et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence that ﬁrms
partially disclose earnings information to the ﬁnancial market. We will use a simi-
lar framework of uncertain informedness to study strategic disclosure by racing R&D
laboratories.
The incentives to acquire and disclose information have been studied in ﬁrm-
ﬁnancial market (see Verecchia, 1990), buyer-seller (see Shavell, 1994) and lobbyist-
government (see Lagerlöf, 1997) settings. These papers endogenize the degree of
informedness of the sender, but abstract from competition between senders. Papers
in which ﬁrms strategically disclose information under competition are Admati and
Pﬂeiderer (2000), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), and Shin (1998). The setup of these
papers, however, is such that senders disclose or conceal information to a third party.
Both Shavell (1994) and Admati and Pﬂeiderer (2000) are interested in the eﬀects of
d i s c l o s u r er e g u l a t i o n .T h i si sam a i nt h e m eo ft h i sp a p e rt o o .
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First we study a problem in
which competing ﬁrms disclose to each other. Disclosed information aﬀects competi-
tion in R&D. And second we endogenize the extent to which ﬁrms are uninformed,
by allowing ﬁrms to acquire costly information. This means that we endogenize the
costs and beneﬁts of both information acquisition and disclosure. This is the main
contribution of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section of this paper we describe
the model. The third section discusses the benchmark of joint-proﬁt-maximizing
investments. Section 4 gives equilibrium R&D investments and proﬁts when ﬁrms
4are required to disclose their information. We compare the benchmark investments
with the equilibrium investments under mandatory disclosure. Section 5 gives the
equilibrium R&D investments and disclosure choices when ﬁrms voluntarily disclose
information, and we compare expected proﬁts under mandated disclosure with those
under voluntary disclosure. After this basic analysis we introduce knowledge spillovers
in the sixth section. In section 7 we endogenize the ﬁrms’ informedness by introducing
information acquisition investments. Finally section 8 concludes the paper. All proofs
to the paper’s main propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
Two ﬁrms compete for an innovation. At the beginning of the race each ﬁrm does not
know its cost of investment, θi for ﬁrm i,w i t hi =1 ,2.F i r mi has either low costs of
investment, θi = θ, or high costs of investment, θi = θ,w i t h0 < θ < θ and i =1 ,2.
The two ﬁrms’ costs are identically independently distributed. The prior probability
for ﬁrm i to have low R&D cost is p,w i t h0 <p<1.
Firm i learns about its cost of investment from a signal, Θi. With probability ri
ﬁrm i learns its true cost of investment, Θi = θi. However, with probability 1 − ri
ﬁrm i receives an uninformative signal, Θi = ∅.F i r mi’s information from nature is




















Figure 1: Firm i’s information
Information obtained by ﬁr m si sv e r i ﬁable. Only the fact whether or not a ﬁrm
is informed is not veriﬁable. If ﬁrm i receives information θi, it can choose to either
disclose or conceal this, i.e. the ﬁrm chooses its communication δi(θi) from the set
{θi,∅}.A nu n i n f o r m e dﬁrm can only state δi(∅)=∅. It therefore suﬃces to denote





i ∈ {δi(Θi)|Θi ∈ {θ,θ,∅}}, i.e. δ
∗
i is the message from ﬁrm i to j,f o ri,j =1 ,2
and i 6= j.
After signals are received from nature and rivals, each ﬁrm invests in R&D by
investing Di ∈ [0,1],a tc o s tC(Di;θi)=1
2θiD2
i with i =1 ,2.N o t et h a tﬁrm i’s cost
of investment is increasing in θi. With probability Di ﬁrm i invents, with probability
1 − Di it does not invent. In this paper we study a “winner-takes-all” race. A ﬁrm
gets payoﬀ W,i fi ti st h eo n l yﬁrm that invents. If both ﬁrms invent, both ﬁrms get
payoﬀ T.I faﬁrm does not invent, it gets no payoﬀ. Naturally, we take W ≥ 2T ≥ 0.
Deﬁne ∆ ≡ W − T as the prize diﬀerence between winning and tying in the race.
Because T is non-negative and cannot exceed 1
2W, we obtain that 1
2W ≤ ∆ ≤ W.
For convenience we assume that θ ≥ 3∆, which enables us to focus on interior R&D
investment solutions.
Firms are risk-neutral. Given the cost of investment θi, ﬁrm i’s expected R&D
proﬁti s :












with D =( Di,D j). We solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to sym-
metric, pure strategy equilibria.
3 Benchmark: Joint-Proﬁt-Maximization
In this section we solve for the joint-proﬁt-maximizing outcome of the race. Note that
for joint proﬁts full disclosure is never worse than any other disclosure rule – ﬁrms
can always choose to ignore disclosed information. It is therefore optimal to take
δi(Θi) ≡ Θi for i =1 ,2.F i r mi’s expected investment cost, θ
E







θ,f o rΘi = θ
E(θ),f o rΘi = ∅
θ,f o rΘi = θ.
(3.1)





















6This gives the following joint-proﬁt-maximizing R&D investment Di for ﬁrm i:
θ









E(Θj) − 4∆2,w i t hi,j =1 ,2, i 6= j. (3.4)
Note that it is best to let a more eﬃcient ﬁrm i, θ
E(Θi) < θ
E(Θj), invest relatively
more in R&D. Firm i’s joint-proﬁt-maximizing investments decrease in its expected
costs, θ
E(Θi), for any given expected rival’s costs θ
E(Θj).A n d a ﬁrm’s investment
increases in its rival’s expected cost of investment, given its own expected costs. Firm








WDi(Θi,Θj),f o ri =1 ,2. (3.5)
The intuitive result that ﬁrms’ investments and proﬁts depend on their relative costs
of investment is in contrast with results in companion paper Jansen (2001). Since in
that paper the costs of investment are identical, due to perfect correlation, only the
absolute cost of investment matters.
4 Mandatory Disclosure
In this section we study the equilibrium in which ﬁrms are required to disclose their
information (Θi,Θj). Such a disclosure regulation could be implemented by the threat
of severe penalties after withholding of information is discovered. Such a regulation is
eﬀectively chosen by the European Medical Evaluation Agency for evaluating medicine
innovations, as argued in the introduction. Observe that the only diﬀerence between
t h eb e n c h m a r ka n dt h i sc a s ei st h a tw ei n t r o d u c ec o m p e t i t i o ni nR & D .
When ﬁrms are required to disclose their signals, they base their investment deci-
sion on their relative costs of investment. Firm i’s expected proﬁts given ﬁrms’ signals
Θ is:
















E(Θj) − ∆2 and (4.2)










7respectively, with i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.F i r m i’s equilibrium investments depend on
expected costs θ
E(Θi) and θ
E(Θj) in a similar fashion as its joint-proﬁt-maximizing
investments do. Competing ﬁrms do not internalize the adverse eﬀect that an increase
in one ﬁrm’s investment has on the chance of its rival to win the race. This business-
stealing eﬀect causes ﬁrms to overinvest in R&D, which is shown in the following
lemma, for i =1 ,2 and i 6= j.
Lemma 1 In the race with mandatory information disclosure both ﬁrms overinvest
in R&D: b Di(Θi,Θj) > Di(Θi,Θj) for all (Θi,Θj).
5 Voluntary Disclosure
In the previous sections ﬁr m sw e r er e q u i r e dt od i s c l o s et h e i ri n f o r m a t i o n . I nt h i s
section we characterize ﬁrms’ equilibrium R&D investments after ﬁr m sd i s c l o s eo n l y
good news about their R&D cost, i.e. (δi(θ),δi(θ)) = (θ,∅).Aﬁrm that discloses good
news and conceals bad news about its cost of investment discourages its rival to invest
in R&D. Disclosure of only low costs makes a ﬁrm’s rival expect strong competition
of the disclosing ﬁrms. We call such a disclosure choice vaporware disclosure, and we
show that ﬁrms actually choose this disclosure rule in equilibrium.
5.1 Equilibrium Investments
We derive the R&D investments under the vaporware disclosure rule, (δi(θ),δi(θ)) =
(θ,∅) for i =1 ,2. Firms’ incentives to invest under vaporware are driven by the
strategic eﬀect of information disclosure. First we introduce the following notation:
ﬁrm i that received signal Θi, consequently sends message δ
∗
i = δi(Θi), and received
message δ
∗




j) in equilibrium. We distinguish three diﬀerent sit-
uations for ﬁrms. Either both ﬁrms disclose, only one ﬁrm discloses, or both ﬁrms
conceal information. We discuss ﬁrms’ equilibrium investments in these situations
below.
When both ﬁrms learn that they have low costs of investment, they disclose
this cost information. They therefore invest as under mandatory disclosure, i.e.
e Di(θ;θ,θ)=b Di(θ,θ).





j)=( θ,∅).I nt h a tc a s eﬁrm j could either be a high-cost ﬁrm,
or an uninformed ﬁrm. Given vaporware disclosure, ﬁrm i assigns probability qj to





and maximizes its expected proﬁts. This gives ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst-order condition:





Firm j has complete information about its rival’s costs, and its investments are de-
termined by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
E(θ)Dj(∅)=W − ∆Di and θDj(θ)=W − ∆Di. (5.3)
Note that E(θ)Dj(∅)=θDj(θ). When we substitute this in ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst-order con-
dition, and deﬁne βj as:
βj ≡ qjE(θ)+( 1− qj)θ, (5.4)












θE(θ)θ − βj∆2¢,f o rΘj ∈ {θ,∅}. (5.6)
Note that ﬁrm j invests less if it received bad news, and ﬁrm j always invests less
than ﬁrm i in this equilibrium. After information (θ,∅) is disclosed, ﬁrms know that
ﬁrm i has lower expected marginal costs of investment than ﬁrm j. This encourages
ﬁrm i, and discourages ﬁrm j to invest in R&D.
Since βj is decreasing in rj, it is easily veriﬁed that e Di(θ;θ,∅) is increasing in
rj, while both e Dj(∅;∅,θ) and e Dj(θ;∅,θ) are decreasing in rj.W h e nﬁrm j’s signal
precision rj increases and ﬁrm j sends an uninformative signal, ﬁrm i puts more weight
on competing with a high-cost ﬁrm j.T h i se n c o u r a g e sﬁrm i, and discourages ﬁrm j
in the R&D stage of the race. In particular, when ﬁrm j is expected to be uninformed,
rj =0 , ﬁrms invest their full disclosure amounts b Di(θ,∅) and b Dj(∅,θ), respectively.
If ﬁrm j is expected to be fully informed, rj =1 , ﬁrms invest in equilibrium b Di(θ,θ)
and b Dj(θ,θ), respectively. For signal precisions strictly between zero and one, ﬁrm
i invests strictly between these mandated disclosure investment levels: b Di(θ,∅) <
e Di(θ;θ,∅) < b Di(θ,θ) for 0 <r j < 1.F o r 0 <r j < 1,i n f o r m e dﬁrm j invests more
9under vaporware disclosure, e Dj(θ;∅,θ) > b Dj(θ,θ), while uninformed ﬁrm j invests
less, e Dj(∅;∅,θ) < b Dj(∅,θ). Under vaporware disclosure informed ﬁrm j pools with
its uninformed counterpart, which discourages ﬁrm i’s investments, and consequently
encourages ﬁrm j to invest. When ﬁrm j is actually uninformed and pools with its
high cost counterpart, this encourages its rival and discourages ﬁrm j to invest in
R&D.





(∅,∅). This gives the following ﬁrst-order conditions (for Θi ∈ {θ,∅} and i,j =1 ,2,




















´,f o rΘi ∈ {θ,∅}. (5.8)
for i =1 ,2,a n di 6= j.N o t et h a te Di(θ;∅,∅) < e Di(∅;∅,∅).A nu n i n f o r m e dﬁrm is
more optimistic about its costs, and therefore invests more in equilibrium.
When ﬁrm j’s signal precision rj increases, it becomes more likely that conceal-
ing ﬁrm j actually received bad news. This encourages ﬁrm i to invest in R&D.
Therefore ﬁrm i’s investments are increasing in rj. Conversely ﬁrm j’s R&D invest-
ments decrease in response to ﬁrm i’s increased investments. If ﬁrms are equally
likely to be informed, i.e. ri = r for i =1 ,2, and likelihood r increases, the direct
positive eﬀe c td o m i n a t e st h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect, and consequently investments increase.
It is intuitive that: b Di(Θi,∅) ≤ e Di(Θi;∅,∅) ≤ b Di(Θi,θ) for Θi ∈ {∅,θ},w i t h
e Di(∅;∅,∅)=b Di(∅,∅) for ri = rj =0 ,a n de Di(θ;∅,∅)=b Di(θ,θ) for ri = rj =1 .
Firm i’s expected equilibrium R&D proﬁts, given disclosed information (δi(Θi),δ
∗
j)











for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j.
We summarize the ﬁndings of this subsection in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Take (δi(θ),δi(θ)) = (θ,∅), ri = rj = r and i =1 ,2, i 6= j.
(i) For 0 <r<1, equilibrium R&D investments have the following properties:
(i.a) e Di(θ;∅,θ) < e Di(∅;∅,θ) < e Di(θ;θ,θ) < e Di(θ;θ,∅),a n d
e Di(θ;∅,θ) < e Di(θ;∅,∅) < e Di(∅;∅,∅) < e Di(θ;θ,∅);
10(i.b) ∂ e Di(Θi;δi(Θi),θ)/∂r<0 for Θi ∈ {∅,θ},a n d
∂ e Di(Θi;δi(Θi),∅)/∂r>0 for Θi ∈ {θ,∅,θ};
(ii) R&D investments under mandatory and vaporware disclosure compare as follows:
(ii.a) b Di(Θi,∅) ≤ e Di(Θi;e δi(Θi),∅) ≤ b Di(Θi,θ),f o rΘi ∈ {θ,∅,θ},
e Di(θ;θ,θ)=b Di(θ,θ), e Di(∅;∅,θ) ≤ b Di(∅,θ),a n de Di(θ;∅,θ) ≥ b Di(θ,θ);
(ii.b) For r =0 : e Di(∅;∅,∅)=b Di(∅,∅)
for r =1 : e Di(Θi;δi(Θi),δj(Θj)) = b Di(Θi,Θj) with Θi,Θj ∈ {θ,θ},
e Di(∅;∅,δj(Θj)) = θ
E(θ) b Di(θ,Θj) with Θj ∈ {θ,θ}.
5.2 Disclosure Equilibrium
In the previous subsection we characterized equilibrium R&D investments under the
vaporware disclosure rule. This section shows that the vaporware rule is indeed chosen
in equilibrium.
First we show that other pure-strategy disclosure rules are not chosen by both
ﬁrms in equilibrium (see Appendix).
Lemma 3 Under voluntary disclosure equilibria do not exist in which:
(i) Both ﬁrms disclose all information: (δi(θ),δi(θ)) = (θ,θ),f o ri =1 ,2;
(ii) Both ﬁrms conceal all information: (δi(θ),δi(θ)) = (∅,∅),f o ri =1 ,2;
There is no equilibrium in which both ﬁrms completely disclose their information.
If a ﬁrm’s rival expects that all information is disclosed, the ﬁrm can discourage
its rival to invest in R&D by unilaterally concealing high cost information. There
is no equilibrium in which both ﬁrms fully conceal their information. An informed
eﬃcient ﬁrm creates a strategic advantage in the R&D stage of the race by unilaterally
disclosing its cost of investment. Given these disclosure incentives it is intuitive that
the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 In any symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium with voluntary disclosure
ﬁrms disclose low cost information, while they conceal high costs: (e δi(θ),e δi(θ)) =
(θ,∅),f o ri =1 ,2.
Note that the equilibrium disclosure rule is the opposite of the equilibrium rule for
the model with perfect positive correlation between costs of investment, as in Jansen
(2001). In that paper the strategic eﬀect of information disclosure is generically dom-
inated by an informational eﬀect. With independently distributed costs of investment
this informational eﬀect of disclosure disappears, and results are completely driven
11by the strategic eﬀect of disclosure. By preannouncing good news about your costs
of investment, you disclose yourself as a tough competitor in the R&D stage of the
game. This discourages your rival’s investments. And since there is only one eﬀect
that drives this result, it holds for all parameter values.
5.3 Overall ProﬁtC o m p a r i s o n
In this section we compare expected proﬁts under mandatory disclosure with those
under voluntary disclosure. Firm i’s expected proﬁt under mandatory disclosure is as
follows:
b Πi(ri,r j) ≡ EΘi
©
prjb πi(Θi,θ)+( 1− prj)
£
qjb πi(Θi,θ)+( 1− qj)b πi(Θi,∅)
¤ª
. (5.10)
Under mandatory disclosure ﬁr m se v a l u a t et h ee x p e c t e dp r o ﬁt of disclosed costs.
Conversely under vaporware disclosure ﬁrms evaluate the proﬁt of expected costs. In
particular ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁtu n d e rv a p o r w a r ed i s c l o s u r ei sa sf o l l o w s :
e Πi(ri,r j) ≡ EΘi
n
prje πi(Θi;e δi(Θi),θ)+( 1− prj)e πi(Θi;e δi(Θi),∅)
o
. (5.11)
Since the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions are convex in their cost signals, they prefer the ex-
pected proﬁt of disclosed signals over the proﬁt of expected signals. We state this
formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Firms that fully disclose their information expect higher proﬁts than
ﬁrms that choose vaporware disclosure strategies: b Πi(ri,r j) ≥ e Πi(ri,r j) for all (ri,r j).
Although ﬁrms have interim incentives to conceal bad news, ex ante they have an
incentive to commit to full information disclosure. Disclosure regulation would help
the ﬁrms to achieve higher ex ante expected proﬁts.
6 Knowledge Spillovers
Not only information about the rival’s costs of investment is relevant for a ﬁrm,
but also the contents of the rival’s R&D technology becomes valuable. When ﬁrm i
discovers that it has low costs of investment while ﬁrm j has high costs, ﬁrm j would
like to imitate its rival’s R&D technology, and beneﬁtf r o me ﬃcient R&D technology.
To model this eﬀect we assume that an exogenous fraction κ ∈ [0,1] of an eﬃcient
ﬁrm’s knowledge spills over to the rival after disclosure. When a ﬁrm’s rival discloses
12low costs, the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from the knowledge spillover. Naturally, whenever ﬁrm
i d o e sn o td i s c l o s eal o wc o s ts i g n a l ,n ok n o w l e d g es p i l l so v e rt oﬁrm j.F i r m i’s















Note that the case of no spillover, κ =0 , corresponds to the study of previous sections.
The case of full spillover, κ =1 , under required disclosure eﬀectively gives perfect
positive correlation with Pr[θi = θj = θ]=1−(1−p)2,a n dPr[θi = θj = θ]=( 1−p)2.
In companion paper Jansen (2001), where R&D costs are perfectly positively cor-
related, knowledge spillovers are not relevant. Since ﬁr m sh a v ei d e n t i c a lc o s t so f
investment, information disclosure does not enable ﬁrms to catch up.
6.1 R&D Investments with Knowledge Spillovers
First we study the eﬀects that knowledge spillovers have on the R&D investment
strategies of the previous sections. That is, we take the disclosure rules of previous
sections as given, and focus on R&D. In the next subsection we ﬁnd conditions under
which these disclosure strategies are still employed in equilibrium, and what other
disclosure equilibrium may emerge.
The joint-proﬁt-maximizing outcome and the equilibrium investments under manda-
tory disclosure are similar to those without knowledge spillovers, with θ
E(Θi) and
θ
E(Θj) replaced by θ
κ(Θi,Θj) and θ
κ(Θj,Θi), respectively.
The equilibrium R&D investments under vaporware disclosure only diﬀer from





In that case the equilibrium investments e Dκ
i (θ;θ,∅) and e Dκ
j(Θj;∅,θ) are as in ex-







j ≡ κθ +( 1− κ)βj.
The more knowledge spills over from an eﬃcient ﬁrm to its rival, the more ag-
gressive the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s rival becomes, and therefore the lower its incentive to
invest in R&D. The ﬁrm that receives the knowledge increases its R&D productivity,
and has therefore a bigger incentive to invest in R&D. The more the receiving ﬁrm’s
productivity increases, the bigger this ﬁrm’s investment incentives.
Given the eﬀects of an increase in spillover on the R&D investments, we can study
the overall eﬀect of an increase in spillover on expected equilibrium proﬁts. On the
one hand, the more knowledge spills over to ﬁrm i from its rival, the higher ﬁrm
13i’s expected proﬁt. It is therefore immediate that if ﬁrm i is always uninformed
(ri =0 ), then its expected equilibrium proﬁt increases in the knowledge spillover. On
the other hand, if the amount of knowledge that spills over from ﬁrm i to its rival
increases, this decreases ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt. It is therefore immediate that if ﬁrm
i’s rival is uninformed (rj =0 ), i.e. information can only spill over from ﬁrm i to its
rival, then ﬁrm i’s expected equilibrium proﬁt decreases in the knowledge spillover.
For symmetric distributions of information among ﬁrms (ri = rj)t h eﬁr m sf a c ea
more subtle trade-oﬀ between these two opposing spillover eﬀects. We show in the
proposition below that in this case the positive eﬀect on expected proﬁts outweighs
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect.
Proposition 3 (i) For Θ 6=( θ,θ), and given disclosure rules of the previous sections,
equilibrium investments of an eﬃcient (resp. ineﬃcient or uninformed) ﬁrm decrease
(resp. increase) in the size of spillover κ:
∂ b Dκ
i (θ,Θj)/∂κ < 0 and ∂ e Dκ
i (θ;θ,∅)/∂κ < 0 for Θj ∈ {θ,∅},a n d
∂ b Dκ
i (Θi,θ)/∂κ > 0 and ∂ e Dκ
i (Θi;∅,θ)/∂κ > 0,f o rΘi ∈ {θ,∅}.
(ii) If ri = rj = r, then expected equilibrium proﬁts increase in knowledge spillover κ:
∂b Πκ
i (r,r)/∂κ > 0,a n d∂e Πκ
i (r,r)/∂κ > 0.
It follows from part (ii) of the proposition that under mandatory disclosure ﬁrms
expect to beneﬁti ft h e yc o m m i tex ante to share information on the contents of their
R&D technology. Under voluntary disclosure ﬁrms have similar incentives, provided
that ﬁrms choose vaporware disclosure rules. However the ﬁrms’ incentives to disclose
low costs of investment decreases in the knowledge spillover. In the next subsection we
study how equilibrium information disclosure rules depend on knowledge spillovers.
6.2 Disclosure with Knowledge Spillovers
The previous subsection took vaporware disclosure strategies as given. Now we study
when ﬁrms do employ such strategies, and we ﬁnd what other equilibrium may emerge.
Concerning the eﬀect of knowledge spillovers on the ﬁrms’ incentives to disclose
information, we make two observations. First, an informed ineﬃcient ﬁrm never has
an incentive to disclose that it is ineﬃcient. After the ﬁrm discloses bad news its
rival only updates his beliefs on the disclosing ﬁrm, while his own cost expectation
remains unchanged. Second, the disclosure incentives of an informed eﬃcient ﬁrm
depends on the size of the knowledge spillover κ. If only little knowledge spills over
after disclosure, eﬃcient ﬁrms disclose their low costs in equilibrium. The positive
14strategic eﬀect of disclosure outweighs the negative spillover eﬀect in this case. An
informed eﬃcient ﬁrm typically has an incentive to conceal its information, if too
much knowledge spills over to its rival. For high enough κ the strategic eﬀect of
disclosure is outweighed by the spillover eﬀect in most cases. Before we prove this in
ap r o p o s i t i o n ,w ed e ﬁne the following parameter:
αi ≡ ripE(θ)θ + ri(1 − p)θE(θ)+( 1− ri)θθ, (6.2)
and we introduce the following condition:







Proposition 4 (i) There is a critical spillover κ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that an equilibrium
exists in which both ﬁrms preannounce iﬀ κ ≤ κ∗.
(ii) If for all i,j =1 ,2 (i 6= j) condition C.1 holds, then there is a critical spillover
κo ∈ (0,1) such that an equilibrium exists in which both ﬁrms fully conceal iﬀ κ > κo.
Notice that condition C.1 is satisﬁed for both ﬁrms if ﬁrms receive information with
equal probability, i.e. ri = rj.F o rs u ﬃciently asymmetric precisions of information,
one of the ﬁrms has an incentive to unilaterally disclose low R&D costs. In particular,
if ri = ε, rj =1− ε,a n dp =1− ε with ε > 0 suﬃciently small, ﬁrm i may have
an incentive to disclose its low R&D cost even if all knowledge spills over to its rival
after disclosure (κ =1 ). If rj and p are high, ﬁrm i expects to face an informed rival
with low R&D costs. Therefore the knowledge that spills over from ﬁrm i’s disclosure
of low cost is expected to have little eﬀect on ﬁrm j’s eﬃciency. But ﬁrm i’s low-cost
disclosure has a substantial eﬀect on its rival’s beliefs. If ri is low, ﬁrm j expects that
ﬁrm i is uninformed, and therefore (if θ −θ is suﬃciently big) a relatively weak R&D
investor. By disclosing its cost of investment, ﬁrm i surprises its rival, and makes him
realize that ﬁrm i will be an “aggressive” investor in the R&D stage of the game.
From propositions 3 (ii) and 4 we conclude that the expected proﬁts under volun-
tary disclosure initially increase in the knowledge spillover (for κ ≤ κ∗), and subse-
quently remains constant (for κ > κo). Under mandatory disclosure expected proﬁts
increase in the knowledge spillover for all κ.
7 Endogenous Information Acquisition
Disclosure regulation does not only aﬀect the investment incentives after disclosure,
but also has an impact on the incentives to acquire information. In this section
15we endogenize the ﬁrms’ signal precisions (ri,r j).F i r m i invests Ri ∈ [0,1] at cost
of investment 1
2ρR2
i, where investment Ri is not observable and ρ > 0. Expected
information acquisition investments are denoted as (ri,r j).
¥ Joint-Proﬁt-Maximizing Investments: In this subsection we determine the
information acquisition investments that maximize total expected proﬁts, given joint-
proﬁt-maximizing R&D investments. Firm i’s expected proﬁt, given joint-proﬁt-
maximizing R&D investments, is:
Πi(Ri,R j)=Ri
©





RjEθj(πi(∅,θj)) + (1 − Rj)πi(∅,∅)
ª
, (7.1)











π`(∅,Θj),f o rΘj ∈ {θ,θ,∅}. (7.2)
It is easy to verify that
P2
`=1 π`(Θ) is convex in θ
E(Θi) for any θ
E(Θj), and hence
















+( 1− Rj)Ψ(∅). (7.3)
Since Ψ(Θj) > 0 for all Θj, the joint-proﬁt-maximizing information acquisition in-
vestments are non-negative, Ri > 0.
¥ Mandatory disclosure: In the information acquisition stage each ﬁrm maximizes
expected proﬁts, given anticipated equilibrium R&D investments, (b Di, b Dj).F i r mi’s
expected proﬁt, given equilibrium R&D investments, b Πi(Ri,R j),i sa sΠi(Ri,R j) with
πi(Θ) replaced by b πi(Θ).D e ﬁne ﬁrm i’s revenue of information acquisition given its
rival’s signal Θj as follows:
b Ψ(Θj) ≡ Eθi {b πi(θi,Θj)} − b πi(∅,Θj). (7.4)
Since b πi(Θ) is convex in θ
E
i (Θ),i ti si m m e d i a t et h a tb Ψ(Θj) > 0 for all Θj. Maximizing





+( 1− Rj)b Ψ(∅), (7.5)
16for i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j. It is immediate that b Ri > 0,f o ri =1 ,2. In order to obtain an
interior solution of this system of equations for Ri,w eh a v et op u tal o w e r - b o u n do n
cost parameter ρ.
When we compare joint-proﬁt-maximizing information acquisition investments
with equilibrium investments under mandatory disclosure, we obtain that ﬁrms over-
invest under mandatory disclosure.
Proposition 5 Under full information disclosure ﬁrms overinvest in information ac-
quisition, b Ri ≥ Ri. This inequality is strict for interior equilibrium information ac-
quisition investments.
The proposition gives a result that is opposite to that under perfect positive corre-
lation. As shown in Jansen (2001), ﬁrms with perfectly positively correlated costs of
investment always underinvest in information acquisition. If the costs are identically
independently distributed, ﬁrms can no longer free-ride on investments of their rival,
and consequently their incentives to acquire information increase.
¥ Voluntary disclosure: Before the ﬁrms choose their disclosure rules, they invest














j),w i t hδ
∗
j ∈ {θ,∅}. (7.6)





+( 1− pRj)e Ψ(∅). (7.7)
The information acquisition investment, e Ri, that results from these ﬁrst-order
conditions is the equilibrium investment. For the comparison between information
acquisition investments under mandatory and vaporware disclosure, we need to com-
pare the marginal revenues of information acquisition. We can rewrite the ﬁrst-order
condition of information acquisition under mandatory disclosure, expression (7.5), as
follows:
ρRi = pRjb Ψ(θ)+( 1− pRj)
³





1−pRj . A comparison of the terms in the right-hand-sides of expressions
(7.7) and (7.8) gives the following. If ﬁrm j receives good news, Θj = θ,t h e nﬁrm
17i expects under voluntary disclosure relatively higher proﬁt from being informed,
and lower from remaining uninformed, i.e. e Ψ(θ) > b Ψ(θ). This gives it a higher
incentive to acquire information under vaporware disclosure. When ﬁrm j does not
voluntarily disclose information, δ
∗
j = ∅, ﬁrm i faces the following trade-oﬀ.I fﬁrm i
would acquire low or no cost information, Θi ∈ {θ,∅}, it would be better oﬀ under
mandatory disclosure. The ﬁrst observation gives the ﬁrm a lower incentive to acquire
information, while the second gives the ﬁrm a higher incentive to acquire information
under voluntary disclosure. If ﬁrm i would acquire bad news, Θi = θ, its equilibrium
R&D proﬁt under voluntary disclosure would exceed the expected equilibrium proﬁt
under mandatory disclosure. This increases the ﬁrm’s incentive to acquire information
under voluntary disclosure. The relative disincentive of information acquisition under
voluntary disclosure is outweighed by the two extra incentives, i.e. e Ψ(∅) >Q jb Ψ(θ)+
(1 − Qj)b Ψ(∅), if the diﬀerence between high and low cost is not too big. We prove
this in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 For any p, W, ∆ and θ there is an ε > 0, such that if θ ≤ θ +
ε, ﬁrms’ equilibrium information acquisition investments under voluntary disclosure
exceed those under mandatory disclosure, i.e. e Ri ≥ b Ri for i =1 ,2. This holds with
strict inequality for interior equilibrium information acquisition investments.
¥ Overall Proﬁt Comparison: In the model with endogenous information acqui-
sition investments the overall proﬁt comparison should compare expected equilibrium
proﬁt b Πi(b Ri, b Rj)− 1
2ρb R2
i with e Πi(e Ri, e Rj)− 1
2ρe R2
i.T h i sp r o ﬁt comparison is not obvious
for all parameter values. On the one hand, it follows from proposition 2 that for given
(ri,r j) ﬁrms expect a higher equilibrium proﬁt under mandatory disclosure than under
voluntary disclosure. In particular, for ri = e Ri we obtain b Πi(e Ri, e Rj) > e Πi(e Ri, e Rj).O n
the other hand, proposition 6 establishes that in many cases ﬁrms acquire less infor-
mation acquisition under mandatory disclosure than under voluntary disclosure, i.e.
b Ri < e Ri. Moreover, each ﬁrm’s expected equilibrium proﬁt under mandatory disclo-
sure increases in the ﬁrms’ information acquisition investments, i.e. db Πi(R,R)/dR > 0
(see Appendix). Therefore b Πi(b Ri, b Rj) < b Πi(e Ri, e Rj) for many parameter values. These
two observations make the overall comparison between b Πi(b Ri, b Rj) and e Πi(e Ri, e Rj) non-
obvious in many cases. The choice for mandatory disclosure then depends on the
trade-oﬀ between higher expected proﬁts for given information acquisition invest-
ments, and lower incentives to acquire information. Observe that this trade-oﬀ is
similar to that in companion paper Jansen (2001).
18Naturally if there are parameter values that do not result in more information ac-
quisition under voluntary disclosure, b Ri ≥ e Ri, then we immediately obtain that overall
expected R&D proﬁts are highest under mandatory disclosure, since: b Πi(b Ri, b Rj) ≥
b Πi(e Ri, e Rj) > e Πi(e Ri, e Rj). In that case, provided that the costs of information acquisi-
tion do not diﬀer greatly, ﬁrms would be better oﬀ under mandatory disclosure.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we developed a theory of information acquisition, strategic disclosure and
R&D in a competitive setting. We have seen that disclosure regulation substantially
aﬀects ﬁrms’ investments, both in information acquisition as well as in R&D. And
ﬁnally, by comparing this paper’s analysis with Jansen (2001), we have shown that
correlation between the costs of R&D investment aﬀect equilibrium disclosure and
investments dramatically.
We have given a model in which vaporware emerges in equilibrium. We have seen
that Microsoft’s alleged strategic preannouncements, and British Biotech’s attempted
concealment can be explained in a dynamic, strategic setting of incomplete informa-
tion. Furthermore we have been able to explain how ﬁrm’s investments and proﬁts
are aﬀected in the diﬀerent regimes. In particular, ﬁrms expect higher proﬁts for
given information acquisition investments under mandatory disclosure, but they may
acquire less information.
The paper assumes a “winner-take-all” race setting. It would be interesting to
study the eﬀects of introducing patents and licensing in this model. This could correct
some of the equilibrium ineﬃciencies. A natural next step would be to study how
results change for intermediate degrees of correlations. For intermediate degrees of
correlation we would expect a more subtle trade-oﬀ between the informational and
strategic eﬀect of information disclosure. These extensions of the basic analysis await
future research.
19A Appendix
This Appendix contains proofs to the main propositions of this paper.
A.1 R&D Investments
The proofs of lemma 1 and 2 are straightforward.
A.2 Voluntary Disclosure
We prove lemma 3 and propositions 1 and 2, respectively.
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 3





i,Θj ∈ {θ,θ,∅}.G i v e nt h a tﬁrm j fully discloses its information
Θj and holds beliefs consistent with full disclosure, an informed and ineﬃcient ﬁrm i

















.( A . 1 )
After ﬁrm i conceals θ its rival invests b Dj(Θj,∅),a n dﬁrm i’s best response to this
investment is as follows:










E(Θj) − ∆2¢ . (A.2)
Concealment of high costs gives ﬁrm i an expected proﬁto f1
2θD2
i.T h i sp r o ﬁt exceeds

















E(Θj) − E(θ)∆2 = b Di(θ,Θj), (A.3)
(ii) Suppose full concealment is an equilibrium strategy for ﬁrms. Under full conceal-
ment the ﬁrms’ equilibrium R&D investments Do(.) are determined by the following
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Consider ﬁrm i’s incentive to unilaterally disclose low R&D costs. After ﬁrm i’s
disclosure the ﬁrms’ R&D investments are determined by the following ﬁrst-order
conditions:
θDi = W −
¡




E(Θj)Dj(Θj)=W − Di∆,f o rΘj ∈ {θ,θ,∅}. (A.8)













Clearly unilateral disclosure of low costs is proﬁtable, since Di >D o
i(θ).T h i s c o m -
pletes the proof.¤
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 1








= prje πi(Θi;e δi(Θi),θ)+( 1− prj)e πi(Θi;e δi(Θi),∅), (A.10)
for Θi ∈ {θ,θ,∅} and i =1 ,2. Distinguish two unilateral deviations from the vapor-
ware disclosure equilibrium.




























































Secondly, a θ-ﬁrm i should not have an incentive to conceal its costs. Expected




j),w i t hδ
∗
j ∈


















The deviation for θ-ﬁrm i is unproﬁtable because θ e Di(θ;θ,θ) − θ e Di(θ;∅,θ) equals:
£
θ(θE(θ) − (1 − qj)∆2) − E(θ)
¡
θ




θE(θ)θ − βj∆2¢ > 0, (A.16)



























. This completes the proof.¤
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Deﬁne stochastic variable xi ∈ {E(θ),θ},w i t hPr[xi = E(θ)] = 1 − Pr[xi = θ]=qi.
Observe that E(xi)=qiE(θ)+( 1− qi)θ = βi.N o w r e w r i t eﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt
under voluntary disclosure as follows:
e Πi(ri,r j)=pri [prjb πi(θ,θ)+( 1− prj)e πi(θ;θ,∅)] +
+prj(1 − pri)
¡
qie πi(θ;∅,θ)+( 1− qi)e πi(∅;∅,θ)
¢
+(1 − prj)(1 − pri)
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22Rewrite ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt under mandatory disclosure as follows:
b Πi(ri,r j) ≡ pri
©
prjb πi(θ,θ)+( 1− prj)
£




qib πi(θ,θ)+( 1− qi)b πi(∅,θ)
ª
(1 − pri)(1 − prj)qi
£
qjb πi(θ,θ)+( 1− qj)b πi(θ,∅)
¤
+(1 − pri)(1 − prj)(1 − qi)
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is convex in y for all y>0 and θ ≥ 3∆,w e
obtain: Exj {F1(xj)} >F 1(βj).F u n c t i o nF2(z) ≡
z(θ−∆)2
(θE(θ)θ−z∆2)
2 is convex in z for all











It is straightforward to show that for all y,z ∈ [E(θ),θ] and θ ≥ 3∆: F0 is convex









.F u r t h e r m o r e F0 i sc l e a r l yc o n v e xi ny (∂2F0(y,z)/∂y2 > 0)f o ra l l




>F 0(βi,βj). From these inequalities
and the inspection of the expected proﬁt functions we conclude that b Πi(ri,r j) ≥
e Πi(ri,r j) for all (ri,r j), which completes the proof.¤
A.3 Knowledge Spillovers
In this part of the Appendix we prove propositions 3 and 4, respectively.
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) The proof is straightforward.
23(ii) Under mandated disclosure the ﬁrst derivative of ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁtw i t h




























= pr(1 − p)r
(θ − θ)(θ − ∆)
£
θθ




κ(θ,θ) − ∆2¢ +
pr(1 − r)
(E(θ) − θ)(θ − ∆)[θθ
































































































i (r,r)/∂κ > 0, for all θ ≥ 3∆, which completes the proof.¤
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) We distinguish two deviations from the vaporware disclosure equilibrium. First
consider ﬁrm i with high R&D cost. As in the proof of proposition 1, we can show that
this ﬁrm does not have an incentive to disclose its cost. We obtain this result simply
by replacing e Di(θ;∅,θ) and b Di(θ,θ) with e Dκ
i (θ;∅,θ) and b Dκ
i (θ,θ), respectively, in the
ﬁrst part of the proof of proposition 1, and by verifying that e Dκ
i (θ;∅,θ) > b Dκ
i (θ,θ) for
all κ. Second consider the incentives of ﬁrm i to conceal low R&D cost, given beliefs
consistent with vaporware disclosure. The expressions are similar to the expressions























This expected equilibrium proﬁt decreases in spillover κ,s i n c ee Dκ
i (θ;θ,∅) decreases
























































, decreases monotonically in spillover κ.A n


































If there is a ﬁrm for which this proﬁtd i ﬀerence is negative, vaporware disclosure is
not an equilibrium disclosure rule for both ﬁrms if κ =1 . It is straightforward to















+( βi − βj)βjθ∆ > 0







T h e r ei sa l w a y saﬁrm for which this condition is satisﬁed. (Suppose the contrary, i.e.
the condition is violated for both ﬁrms. Then for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j the following
two inequalities should be satisﬁed:






/βjθ∆ < βj, (A.31)






/βiθ∆ < βi. (A.32)
25But βi < βj and βj < βi cannot hold simultaneously.) Hence there is always a ﬁrm
that strictly prefers to conceal low R&D costs if κ =1 .S i n c ep r o ﬁts are continuous
and monotonous, there is a critical value κ∗ < 1 such that for all κ > κ∗ there is a
ﬁrm for which concealing low cost is a proﬁtable deviation, given beliefs consistent
with vaporware disclosure. And for all κ ≤ κ∗ vaporware disclosure is an equilibrium
disclosure strategy.
(ii) Suppose condition C.1 is satisﬁed for both ﬁrms. Under full concealment the
ﬁrms’ equilibrium R&D investments Do(.) and proﬁts πo are determined in the proof
of lemma 3 (ii). As in part (i), consider two deviations from the full concealment
equilibrium. First consider the incentive of a high-cost ﬁrm i to unilaterally disclose
its cost. After this unilateral disclosure the ﬁrms’ R&D investments are determined
by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
θDi = W −
¡




E(Θj)Dj(Θj)=W − Di∆,f o rΘj ∈ {θ,θ,∅}. (A.34)













i(θ),s i n c eαi > θE(θ). (A.35)
Therefore disclosure of high costs is not a proﬁtable unilateral deviation from full
concealment. Second consider ﬁrm i’s incentive to disclose low R&D costs. After
ﬁrm i discloses its low cost, ﬁrms R&D investments are determined by the following
ﬁrst-order conditions:












κ(Θj,θ)Dj(Θj)=W − Di∆,f o rΘj ∈ {θ,θ,∅}. (A.37)




















j is αj with E(θ) and θ replaced by θ
κ(∅,θ) and θ
κ(θ,θ), respectively. It
is intuitive and straightforward to show that investment Di(κ), and consequently
expected proﬁt πi(κ),i sd e c r e a s i n gi nκ.F o r κ =0we already showed in lemma 3
26(ii) that unilateral disclosure of low costs is proﬁtable. If all information spills over
from the disclosing ﬁrm (i) to the concealing ﬁrm (j), i.e. κ =1 , unilateral deviation
from full concealment is not proﬁtable if Do
i(θ) >D i(1) = b Di(θ,θ), which holds under
condition C.1. Since proﬁts are continuous and monotonous in spillover κ,t h e r ei sa
critical value κo ∈ (0,1) such that for all κ < κo there is a ﬁrm for which disclosing
low cost is a proﬁtable deviation, given beliefs consistent with full concealment. And
for all κ ≥ κo full concealment is an equilibrium disclosure strategy. This completes
the proof of the proposition. ¤
A.4 Endogenous Information Acquisition
This part of the Appendix proves propositions 5 and 6, respectively.
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 5
For the comparison between joint-proﬁt-maximizing and equilibrium information ac-
quisition investments we need to compare marginal information acquisition revenues
under total-proﬁt-maximization and mandated disclosure. We obtain overinvestment
in information acquisition when the marginal revenue in equilibrium exceeds marginal
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As u ﬃcient condition for overinvestment by ﬁrm i is then that for all Rj:
RjEθj [Eθi {Hi(θi,θj)} − Hi(E(θ),θj)] + (1 − Rj)[Eθi {Hi(θi,E(θ))} − Hi(E(θ),E(θ))] < 0.
(A.41)
If function Hi is concave in θi for all θj, then this suﬃcient condition is met for any
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Since hi(e θ) < 0 for all e θ ≥ 0,f u n c t i o nHi is concave in θi,f o ra l lθi,θj ≥ 3∆.T h i s
completes the proof.¤
A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 6
We show that in equilibrium ﬁrms invest more under voluntary disclosure than under
mandatory disclosure, by showing that marginal information acquisition investments
under voluntary disclosure exceed those under mandatory disclosure. We focus on
symmetric information acquisition equilibria, ri = Ri = R for i =1 ,2. Rewrite the
marginal information acquisition revenues under mandatory disclosure as in expression
(7.8). Inequality e Ψ(θ) > b Ψ(θ) follows directly from lemma 2, since:
e Di(θ;θ,θ)=b Di(θ,θ), e Di(θ;∅,θ) ≥ b Di(θ,θ),a n de Di(∅;∅,θ) ≤ b Di(∅,θ). (A.45)
In the remainder of this proof we show that for θ close to θ and given Θj 6= θ, expected
marginal information acquisition revenues under voluntary disclosure exceed those
under mandated disclosure, i.e. K(R;θ) > 0,w i t h :










28F i r s tw es h o wt h a tf o re x t r e m ei n v e s t m e n tl e v e lR =0the inequality holds. From
lemma 2 (ii.b) we conclude that for K(0;θ) > 0,s i n c e :
e Ψ(∅)=pθ b Di(θ,∅)




2 − E(θ)b Di(∅,∅)
2 > b Ψ(∅). (A.47)
Second we show that the diﬀerence between marginal information acquisition rev-
enues under voluntary and mandated disclosure increases in R,i fθ is close to θ.G i v e n
that K(0;θ) > 0,i ts u ﬃces to show that for θ suﬃciently close to θ, ∂K(R;θ)/∂R>0
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b k(θ) ≡ b Ψ(θ) − b Ψ(∅). (A.50)
It is easily veriﬁed that limθ↓θ
∂K(R;θ)
∂R =0for any R.F o r∂K(R;θ)/∂R>0 to hold for





> 0. For then there is an ε > 0
such that ∂K(R;θ)/∂R>0 for θ ∈ (θ,θ +ε].W h e nw ed i ﬀerentiate ∂K(R;θ)/∂R to
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2∆pθ[−p − (1 − p)+1 ]
(θ − ∆)(θ + ∆)3
=
2∆2p2
(θ − ∆)(θ + ∆)3 > 0. (A.51)
This ﬁnal result is suﬃcient to show that K is positive for all R, which completes the
proof.¤
A.4.3 Overall ProﬁtC o m p a r i s o n
For ri = rj = R, ﬁrm i’s expected R&D proﬁt reduces to the following:
b Π
o
i(R) ≡ b Πi(R,R)= REθi
©





REθj[b πi(∅,θj)] + (1 − R)b πi(∅,∅)
¢
.(A.52)
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